5/20/09 9:01 AM
ANF\PROPOSAL\RANT

In the spring of 1961—and to this day—I regarded SIOP-62—in the light of the JCS' own estimate that it would kill 500-600 million people—as the most evil plan that had ever existed in the history of humanity.

The preparations to carry it out, and the contingent intentions to do so in a variety of contingencies, I judged to be the most evil human project, preparations and human intentions in history.

The completed preparations, the operational readiness to implement them within minutes and complete the execution of them within an hour or two, and the official consideration of even the most murderous of these capabilities a legitimate "option" continue to this day (twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the Soviet enemy), as evil as ever.

Every aspect of the process that culminated in this operational readiness to exterminate half a billion humans (which in reality would kill between one and six billion) represented a moral catastrophe.

From its roots in WWII city bombing—the German Blitz, followed quickly by UK terror bombing, USAAF pseudo-"precision" bombing leading to participation in indiscriminate city bombing and the firestorm in Dresden, USAAF fire-bombing of Tokyo and 67 other cities, finally Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and postwar planning in which A-bombs were targeted on Soviet cities, then the development and testing of the H-bomb and the substitution of H-bombs for A-bombs (which had simply replaced 1000-plane conventional attacks) in WWII-type terror-attack plans targeting cities (and an increasing number of military targets, many near cities, including East Europe): each incremental step led closer to the completed destruction of the machinery for extermination and possible extinction that has existed for the last fifty years.

Each step seemed, to its proponents, reasonable and legitimate. But each since the Blitz was kept effectively secret, lest it arouse controversy and moral unease in at least a minority of the public even if, in the atmosphere of the World War and later the Cold War it would have had majority support. Inside the governments there were intense qualms among some doubters at various points (though least, from the record, during one of the most consequential decisions in moral/legal terms, the project of firebombing Japanese cities)—including scientists before the Trinity test and the crash development and testing of the H-bomb—though in no case did the dissenters take their warning or their struggle to the public.
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February 1942, a moral threshold was crossed (secretly) by the UK, followed in an incremental process by the USAAF over 1943-44 that culminated in the five-month firebombing campaign against Japanese cities: by any standards, a horribly immoral and

illegal project, one of the great war crimes of the Twentieth Century. And a precedent which made the A-bomb decisions unproblematic morally for US decision-makers and, unchallenged, made the postwar nuclear planning almost inevitable, with its species-threatening implications.

My own feelings when I looked at the plans and concrete preparations for carrying them out in 1961, and really ever since, were that they represented a human project, by Americans, as evil as the completed Final Solution of the Nazis. Or rather, even more evil, by a vast proportion, in light of its scope, the projected body count, promising a hundred Holocausts. (I didn't know then of the possibility of nuclear winter and possible extinction or near-extinction).

Surely the planning and preparation were worse than the planning and preparation for the Holocaust. Yes, the latter was "unconditional," meant to be carried out "no matter what," even less conditional than the firebombing (which could have been stopped by Japanese surrender: though hopefully—in the eyes of Truman and Byrnes and Groves (and perhaps Oppenheimer, Conant?)—not before there was time to use the A-bomb).

How does one, in general, compare the morality of a deterrent threat to do unprecedented harm that may well be carried out under foreseen (or unforeseen) conditions, to a decision to do large but very much less harm unconditionally, which is actually carried out? I know of no general ethical analysis of such comparisons. But I was moved at the time, and I still am, subjectively, in the light of the absolutely staggering difference in the unprecedented destruction proposed by the SIOP compared to all historical experience including the "Final Solution" (of the "Jewish problem" only)—what seemed even then, and has turned out to be literally, a possible Final Solution of the human problem—to conclude that we were not only like the Germans (at their worst), but that what our leaders had directed and their subordinates carried out was *worse* than what the Germans, or anyone else, had ever done.

It *was* and remains, I believed and still believe, the most evil human project that has ever occurred, even compared to massacres that had actually been carried out. To conceive of doing *this,* to decide to make it possible and to carry that out, to threaten it and to be ready operationally and at least to some extent psychologically to do so under circumstances that had a significant probability of occurring (much higher, in retrospect, than most are aware of to this day) despite our efforts to deter and prevent them: such human intentionality and effort does not bear favorable comparison to any policy-making that has ever existed, from the earliest empires and barbarian invasions to the worst of modern times.

Merely as risk-taking (which has not yet, and conceivably might never culminate in actual destruction, unlike many earlier projects of massacre) it has been an unbearably reckless, evil gamble.

It may be imprudent, in terms of public acceptance and influence of my argument, to present this particular judgment in my book. Even Tom Reifer was resistant to it when I

first suggested it to him: that the planning, policy and posture themselves were worse than the (completed) Holocaust. Not that our planners and decision-makers were worse, more evil, persons than the Nazis: but that what they have done and maintained is worse—in its implications and actual consequences (risks) for humanity—than what the Nazis accomplished. That's what I feel. It doesn't mean to me that Americans are worse than the Germans who went along with what the Nazis were doing. It does mean that we are no different, no better. I believe that.

Others have been thinking that, of course, over the last six years, with reference to our actions in Iraq (and for some, the Constitutional abuses), compared to Hitler's aggressions (rather than to the Holocaust). That comparison, in fact, is exact, and inescapable to any knowledgeable about both. Some years ago the New Yorker quoted the child of German immigrants as saying that she had, like others, always condemned her parents' generation of Germans for their passivity, their failure to resist effectively or at all; now she realized, she said, "how helpless they must have felt."

That still leaves the Holocaust without precedent in American experience (recent: since the extermination of the Native Americans). (The 1.7 million civilians killed by bombing in WWII—800,000 Japanese before Hiroshima, 600,000 Germans, 300,000 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the more than one million Iraqi civilians killed so far are in the ball-park, compared, say, to Auschwitz. But few Americans are aware of either of these).

But the secret planning of which I became aware in 1959-61 exceeded any of these earlier massacres in its projected death-toll, if carried out, to an almost unimaginable degree. It exceeded all of them put together in history, including those of Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Suharto, the Armenians, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia *together*, along with those of Tamerlane, Genghis Khan, the Romans and Assyrians, *all the massacres of innocents in human experience put together.*

That followed directly from a related comparison, likewise unknown to most Americans. The first test of a single thermonuclear bomb, the American Mike test in 1954, *released more explosive power than that in all the wars in human history together.* The explosive power of fifteen million tons (fifteen "megatons") of high explosive, compared, for example, to the two million tons dropped by the United States in World War II. (There was another two million tons of artillery shells. I haven't seen a total for all combatants, or for World War I or earlier wars, but they wouldn't add up to fifteen megatons).

SIOP-62 scheduled the dropping of *thousands* of thermonuclear weapons on the "Sino-Soviet Bloc," including virtually every city in the Soviet Union and China. Most were not of the yield of the Mike test or larger, perhaps only a few dozen of those; but very many, perhaps most, including those carried by single-pilot fighter-bombers, had the explosive power of half a World War II, a little over a million tons equivalent.

When I read these plans in 1960-61, I was already more knowledgeable than nearly anyone on ways they could be triggered by accident, unauthorized action, or delegated authority far below the level of the president. I knew of our commitment to execute them

in case of a serious blockade or takeover of Berlin or a major incursion into West Germany; this NATO planning, in which all our European partners participated, was itself, I already thought, the most reckless, irresponsible planning in history. But not until I realized in 1961 how conscious the JCS (and Eisenhower) were of the potential scale of our "response," did it appear to be unequivocally condemnable as evil.

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So: tentatively, I give up comparing the evil (which is greater?) of SIOP-62/NATO planning to the Holocaust, American officials and public to the Nazis and Germans.

The bottom line, as they say, is that I regarded the planning as greatly evil. And the shock of that told me more than the conclusion that we (sic) had done something bad. It bore on what people like us (PLU) would do in the future. I could have said, and one could say now, what they/we "might" do, even "might well" do. But my reaction was stronger than that. I had the dark epiphany that people who had made these plans, formed these intentions (to repeat, conditional intentions: even so), carried out these preparations could not be trusted not to destroy civilization in the not-distant future.

More than that: people like that, people like ourselves, *would* do that eventually. Before very long. Recall, this was early 1961; I still believed, if not entirely in the full missile gap—thanks to Andy Marshall in 1960—in a sizeable Soviet missile force, larger than ours; I assumed the balance of terror was delicate, a la AJW, with two large and vulnerable forces tempting each other to false alarms or preemption; the Berlin crisis was at hand. I had not had any impulse to take out TIAA/CREF insurance at RAND (I never did get around to doing so, which is why I have no retirement income now), since I had believed since 1959 that there was a very small chance that Alain Enthoven or I would live to enjoy it.)

In short: I felt I had learned how the world, our world, would end. When I held the JSCP in my hands—one of the only civilians ever to do so—I was reading the death warrant for civilization.

I continue to believe that what I learned about humans that day—in light of the JCS' conscious and unashamed awareness of what they had wrought (and Eisenhower had approved, however reluctantly)—demonstrated what I have said since, that this is not a species to trust with thermonuclear weapons. It is (we are) a species of unprecedented, unique danger to itself and all other "advanced" species. (Chordates? Vertebrates, birds, fish...)

1:04 PM off to lunch, swim. Took adrenal pill.

Sunday, August 22, 2010
ANF\Proposal 10\Dangerous Plans outline

The Most Dangerous Plans in the World

--The most dangerous plans in the history of the world.
As "plans," "preparations," they are part of human history. There have no remotely comparable plans, or dangers, in all of human experience. They could not have existed more than 55 years ago (1954-55) and they have existed ever since in the US, or 45 years (since 1965) in Russia as well. They came into existence within months of the physical capability for them (the destruction, using H-bombs, of most life on earth).

(As if atmospheric ignition had been possible and had been consciously pursued and used as the basis for a deterrent capability: rather than accepted, initially with both A and H tests, as a very remote possibility). Or as if cobalt bombs had been produced and used as basis for threats. (Unlike atmospheric ignition, nuclear winter was not conceived as a possibility for forty years into the nuclear era, 1982; yet has had no known effect on the posture since it was discovered; subject to skepticism and "doubt" for a decade and more, as with tobacco or global warming or nuclear energy dangers or deepwater drilling; but as doubts are disproven, still no real change in policy (except for Gorbachev: displaced), unlike nuclear energy production in US, now being revisited).

--[compare: plans for deepwater drilling, inadequate safety;
plans for many new nuclear plants;
plans for many new coal-fired energy plants
plans to achieve Greater Israel
US neo-con plans for regime change throughout Middle East, Central Asia

Past: Hitler's plans for conquest
Final Solution
Japan: Greater East Asia co-Prosperity Sphere

Secret alliances before WWI
Schlieffen Plan
Mobilization plans of Russia, France, Germany

Manhattan Project

(Options for Vietnam, pressed by JCS; or McNamara/LBJ variants; Nixon plans)

All of the past plans required secrecy (despite Mein Kampf: disbelieved, even in Thirties). PNAC proposals (disbelieved?). Consequences of first three, subject to denial, campaign to create "scientific doubt." (See tobacco. Vioxx, etc. Comparable to doubt about evolution, or belief in rapture and Armageddon.)

Effects of secrecy and extremely small decision group: no examination by experts or public, no feed-back, criticism. Faits accomplis accomplish subject to causing rage, fast, "irrational" (disproportionate, unaccustomed) response, creating crises, faits malaccomplis. No preparation for failure or for extrication when failed; subject to human/organizational tendency to reinforce failure, persist, avoid blame and defeat, escalate. (See Civil War, WWI, WWII (Germany in Russia), (Korea: escalation avoided, but persistence), CII, (C-I: esc avoided; and to some extent, VN 1961); VN1964-75; Iraq; Afghan; (secrecy of Iran plans breached, hence war avoided in 2006-08: or just, Bush and military prudence? Mil opposition, but that was true in Iraq too).]

Origin and aspects of the most dangerous plans:

--WWII bombing of cities and industry (denied to public); commanders carried over into Cold War (LeMay, Power); A-bombs; Ike's New Look, budget concern, USAF supremacy; A-bombs replaced by H-bombs (decision for H); SU=Hitler, bomber/missile gaps.

--Manhattan Project: fear of Germany (=fear of SU, Saddam Hussein, now Iran: all illusory in terms of capability and intent);Hiroshima: need to justify cost, forestall SU role in occupation of Japan (NOT, "end war as fast as 'possible'"), intimidate SU in Europe and CW (lack of consideration of Chicago scientists' warning about arms race: bottled up); H: need for superiority, after SU A-test; political, after Fuchs;

--early uses: Iran (questioned, but probable, in light of later uses); Berlin '48 (bluff, at least initially); Korea '50 (not a bluff, if needed; and '52, '53); belief in effectiveness in '48, '53; Vietnam, '54-60 (successful: non-public); Lebanon/Iraq/Kuwait '58; Quemoy '54, 58; Suez '57 (Soviets: bluff); Berlin '61; Cuba '62 (Soviet effort to imitate NATO, threats both sides, risk of SU use underestimated, effects on both sides); Vietnam '64, '65, '68, '69, 72...

--basis of NATO; especially Berlin (successful); but also, backbone of control of Middle East, South Vietnam (successful), South Korea: sphere up to borders of SU and China/North Korea.

Questionably needed for West Europe. (Needed? To make division of Europe look necessary, prevent dealing with SU, keep West dependent on US, for economic reasons, while assuring dollars for Europe through Congress). But for Berlin, yes. And for South Vietnam, 1954-64 (from NVA) (and prevent Japan dealing with China); South Korea? at first (until 1960?)

Efforts under Nixon, Carter, Reagan, GWB, to achieve limited nuclear options (HAK); failure to limit collateral damage.

ASPECTS:

--plans for hitting all cities of SU and China, collateral damage 600 million.

--neglect of fire effects, ignorance of (ozone and)nuclear winter: actual collateral damage, 1.2 billion or most of life on planet.

--no plan for limited war with Soviet troops: SIOP in all cases. (Ike concern to avoid matching SU conventional forces, leading to inflation in US)

--no plan for general war/Soviet troops that did not attack all Chinese cities. (Despite SU split from China from 1959 on). (PACOM concern)

--warning systems subject to false alarms, not just hypothetically but in experience; ambiguous warning.

--hair-trigger alert: aiming at, finally achieving 10-minute response times.

--airborne alert: actual accidents.

--delegation
--two-man rules universally by-passed.

--authentication subject to unauthorized actions.

--no Stop code. (Strangelove)

--obsession with fraticide/interference led to single plan, no resources for alternatives

--preemption as basis of planning (see WWI plans); or in case of NATO, escalation, first strike. (NOT preventive war, except for LeMay, et al, who would have liked to use crises, like C-II or Berlin, as excuse).

--Likelihood most of these problems are duplicated in other NWS, especially new ones: India, Pakistan, Korea, (Israel?)

--extreme secrecy of plans, allowing for no adequate monitoring, criticism.

Recent times: de-coupling of limited nuclear wars initiated by the US (or India, Pakistan, Israel) from all-out US-Russian war, with end of Cold War, withdrawal of SU nuclear umbrella from others. (Contrary to Helen Caldicott last week, who supposes any war "likely" or "almost certain" to escalate).

(Reductions in US-Russian arsenals and alert forces: NOT significant, yet. Likewise, BHO and other "notables" (prominente)) for nuclear "abolition.")

But increased support for nuclear threats and execution, among neo-cons (Reagan, GWB/Cheney), and AMONG PUBLIC, with decline in fear of all-out escalation. Ambitious/reckless/hopeless neo-con plans to dominate Middle East and world energy. Support for nuc FU threats, as for torture, detention, GWOT, after 9-11.

But opposition among military for nuclear FU, as against Iran (Cheney, 2006-08, 09-10), or even for attack on Iran. (Not reliably a block, if Israel initiates F.A. attack and Iran retaliates against Israel and US).

Anti-proliferation as a rationale for aggression, or even US FU: Iraq, Iran, Pakistan (North Korea: moment passed). Also, anti-WMD, since 1991 (Iraq; why haven't we heard about this in Iran?)

As with global warming/climatic catastrophe: human/social problem (impossibility?) of mobilizing a response to a danger that is seen as: mainly in the future, twenty-thirty years away or longer; "hypothetical," subject to expert controversy, doubt; mainly affecting "others" (though actually, children or grandchildren!); requiring immediate large efforts, opportunity costs, sacrifice (true for global warming; not really true for nuclear disarmament, but spurious fears of loss of "security" are easily appealed to, after generations of indoctrination). Also, human willingness to contemplate or inflict massacre on "others"; declared inhibitions about causing death of "all" (including "us), but doubt as to likelihood of this, and little actual response even when doubts erode (when the danger is a ways off in time).

Unlike deepwater drilling plans—which are disastrous if they fail—these nuclear plans are catastrophic if they are executed perfectly as planned. They are DESIGNED to cause catastrophic damage to humans and society (though the damage will certainly be much greater than planned). True, they are meant to deter; but they can be triggered by many events other than those they are meant to deter. (In other words, even if they succeed in deterring "calculated, deliberate" attacks, they may be triggered by unforeseen courses of events. Their very existence poses incalculable, absolutely unprecedented dangers, unparalleled in human history. Comparable to the dangers of far-less-likely volcanic eruptions (bigger than Krakatoa); earthquakes (never? Equaled in simultaneity), collisions with large meteors or v---- (62 million years ago)

Chapter One

The Bundy Briefing

In February 1961, I asked for and was granted a one hour meeting with McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy. I had spent the previous year most of the nuclear command centers throughout the Pacific, as well as reading U.S. nuclear war plans, as part of a an Office of Naval Research study group on the command and control of nuclear weapons in the Pacific theater. I wanted to brief Bundy on a number of problems I had discovered during this year with the entire command and control system for U.S. nuclear war, as well as with the plans for nuclear war themselves. I felt that ignoring these problems could significantly endanger the continued existence of the not just United States, but of humanity, of life on Earth.

The information I was about to share with him was of the utmost sensitivity—in fact, it was likely he had never heard of anything remotely close to it. As I walked in, I worried that he was might skeptical or suspicious of the fact that I seemed to know so much about war plans as a civilian. I felt rather that I ought to begin by giving him some hints as to how 1 had gotten at this information.

I began to talk of my participation in the Command and Control project and my work with the Joint Staff. After two or three minutes of this, he interrupted me with: "Is this a briefing or a confessional?" At this, I said to myself, "Alright, you asked for it."

This is what I told him:

. . .

I had the satisfaction, within a few minutes of this, of seeing Bundy's mouth drop open. He began to take furious notes, shaking his head and exclaiming under his breath. He asked penetrating questions in rapid succession the whole hour. Outside of his office afterwards, Bundy's assistant Robert Komer seemed impressed: "I have never seen him more concerned."

How did I come to hold the view of the world I shared with Bundy?